The second Trump administration has launched its most audacious military action yet, Operation Epic Fury, a massive joint US-Israeli offensive that killed Iran’s Supreme Leader and bombarded civilians and infrastructure alike. This action is part of Trump’s “less is more” doctrine, an approach that seeks to replace prolonged occupations with swift, overwhelming force to decapitate regimes and achieve decisive outcomes without long-term commitment.

Click here to read this article in Spanish/Español.

Yet President Trump’s recent statement to the New York Post in which he refused to rule out “boots on the ground” in Iran has raised urgent questions if indeed the doctrine is being abandoned or if the statement is part of a bluff to intensify pressure. So, while a large-scale invasion is unlikely in the immediate term, the doctrine faces its most severe test as the administration navigates the treacherous gap between decapitation and genuine regime change.

The second Trump administration’s foreign policy favors short-duration, high-impact operations using airpower and special forces over long-term troop deployments, aiming for maximum surprise and strategic advantage without the burden of occupation. This doctrine has been aggressively implemented. From strikes against Houthi bases in Yemen with Operation Rough Rider to supposedly targeting ISIS in Syria in Operation Hawkeye Strike and over 111 strikes in Somalia, the US has projected power across multiple theaters. Then in Operation Absolute Resolve in Venezuela, using special forces to abduct President Nicolás Maduro and now Operation Epic Fury against Iran is the crescendo of this brutal campaign.

Crucially, this doctrine does not categorically exclude ground forces per se but rather constrains how many are used, what types are deployed, and how long they remain. Beyond the question of direct US military commitment, a more immediate and potentially consequential dimension of the “less is more” doctrine in Iran involves the cultivation of proxy forces to fight on America’s behalf. Reports indicate that the US has been in discussions with Iranian Kurdish militia leaders about potential military operations in western Iran, with the aim of using these battle-hardened groups, familiar with the territory and who have long opposed Tehran to weaken Iranian security forces in border regions through US arms and intelligence support.

Kurdish opposition figures have acknowledged these discussions, though they caution that any move would require the US to first “clean” the airspace above them by destroying Iranian weapons depots, as their forces are “relatively lightly armed” and would be suicidal to deploy against Iran’s entrenched security apparatus without such support. Beyond the Kurds, the US is also believed to be in contact with Baluch minority groups in southeastern Iran and Arab minority factions in Khuzestan province, both predominantly Sunni communities with histories of armed resistance against the Shia-dominated Iranian state. The proxy option carries profound risks of US arming of ethnic factions could inflame internal tensions, trigger wider regional conflict, draw in neighbors like Turkey which views Kurdish empowerment with alarm. This cultivation of chaos by the US may lead to the “Balkanisation” of Iran into warring ethnic strongholds which is something Israel has always desired.

As for neighboring state proxies there’s three actors that could potentially serve for this role Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan and Pakistan. Riyadh has in recent years pursued a multi-vector foreign policy aimed at reducing overreliance on the United States, including cautious rapprochement with Iran itself. Azerbaijan presents another potential flashpoint following an Iranian drone attack on Nakhchivan International Airport, Azerbaijani forces have been placed on high alert along the border with leaves cancelled and reservists recalled, though Baku’s response has thus far been framed as defensive rather than offensive.

Pakistan, meanwhile, appears entirely unavailable as a proxy option, indeed, it represents the opposite dynamic, as violent pro-Iranian protests by Shiite demonstrators have rocked the country, with crowds storming the US Consulate in Karachi and forcing the US Embassy to cancel services, while the Pakistani government deploys troops to restore order. The notion of using Pakistani forces against Iran is untenable given Pakistan’s large and agitated Shiite population and the government’s need to manage domestic fallout from the strikes. In sum, while the proxy option is very much alive and actively being explored by Washington, it represents a high-risk, low-control instrument that could easily metastasize from a “less is more” tool into a catalyst for prolonged ethnic conflict and regional instability, a dynamic that will test the doctrinal limits of the administration’s commitment to avoiding quagmires.

The Iranian Exception

When President Trump said he doesn’t have “yips” about boots on the ground, he was not necessarily abandoning his doctrine. He was preserving the flexibility that the doctrine itself requires. The “less is more” approach is a gamble that overwhelming force can achieve political objectives without entanglement. If the current air campaign fails to topple the regime, the administration will face a choice of accepting failure or to escalate with proxy forces and leave the actual US soldiers as a last resort. Also, he was unclear in what context “boots on the ground” might be contemplated as, if an invasion force, or perhaps special forces coordinating with anti-regime elements or targeting remaining leaders.

The question is whether such an operation will remain temporary for if Iran survives the first month the doctrine’s vulnerability emerges as it assumes surgical violence can produce lasting political change without sustained commitment. Yet the track record for achieving regime change from the air alone is poor and Iran’s internal security apparatus of over 800,000-armed personnel remain intact.

From Decapitations Strikes to a Quagmire?

All in all, assessing the probability of the administration abandoning its “less is more” doctrine requires distinguishing between two distinct scenarios, the first being limited ground involvement that would remain consistent with the doctrine, where if the current air campaign falters, the administration may authorize small-scale special operations to target remaining leaders or secure critical sites—a move that would align with existing precedents like Venezuela and would not represent an abandonment of the doctrine provided the footprint remains limited and temporary. The second and far more consequential scenario is a large-scale conventional invasion that would represent a wholesale rejection of the doctrine, involving multiple divisions and sustained occupation, while the administration is acutely aware of the political costs.

*

Click the share button below to email/forward this article. Follow us on Instagram and X and subscribe to our Telegram Channel. Feel free to repost Global Research articles with proper attribution.

Miguel Santos García is a Puerto Rican writer and political analyst who mainly writes about the geopolitics of neocolonial conflicts and Hybrid Wars within the 4th Industrial Revolution, the ongoing New Cold War and the transition towards multipolarity. Visit his blog here. 

He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG). 

Featured image is from the author

Global Research is a reader-funded media. We do not accept any funding from corporations or governments. Help us stay afloat. Click the image below to make a one-time or recurring donation.