Instability near the Strait of Hormuz, fueled by tensions with Iran and unilateral sanctions on key suppliers, has occurred alongside increased American energy exports.

This indicates that Washington is pursuing the “tap war” strategy—a calculated effort to limit competing oil and gas sources so that the higher-cost US shale gas and LNG can meet global demand.

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This approach is not limited to the Trump administration and reflects a long-term strategy by Washington designed to constrain strategic rivals. By restricting access to dependable Russian and other energy supplies and pressuring European and Gulf economies, Washington promotes its own energy production as the more secure option, even if it comes at a higher cost.

After the outbreak of war in Ukraine in 2022, sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines removed a major low-cost supply route to Europe. The resulting shortage opened the door for American LNG, which sells at a premium compared to Russian pipeline gas. Sanctions on Russian energy exports further restricted global supply. In the Western Hemisphere, the abrupt removal of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro meant that a competitor and its oil resources came under US control. Most recently, war with Iran has brought volatility to the Persian Gulf, the world’s most critical oil transit corridor.

American military bases have had limited success in shielding Gulf Arab states from Iranian retaliation. These bases have historically supported the security of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman. However, when missiles and drones have targeted regional infrastructure, the protection has fallen short.

In March 2026, Iranian strikes hit Qatar’s Ras Laffan Industrial City, home to the world’s largest LNG export complex, fed by the North Field. Two of Qatar’s 14 LNG trains and one gas-to-liquids facility were heavily damaged, knocking out roughly 17% of the country’s export capacity—about 12.8 million tons of LNG per year. QatarEnergy has said repairs will take three to five years, and the lost production is estimated to cost $20 billion in annual revenue. Expansion work on the North Field itself has also been delayed.

Washington deliberately designed this vulnerability of Gulf partners to close the taps of regional producers and encourage global buyers to seek American sources. This experience has also led Gulf countries to question the dependability of automatic alignment with Washington, prompting them to consider greater strategic independence.

American exporters experience short-term benefits through higher benchmark prices and redirected trade flows that benefit US shale gas and LNG producers. However, these policies also impose domestic costs: rising energy prices contribute to inflation, impacting household finances and industrial competitiveness.

In 2025, Americans spent about $12 billion more on natural gas than the previous year, according to federal data. Utility bills for piped gas rose by nearly 11%, adding more than $100 on average to annual expenses for families. As the Iran conflict pushed global prices higher in 2026, residential electricity and heating bills are expected to have increased even more.

Meanwhile, energy-heavy industries such as chemicals, steel, glass, and fertilizers depend on inexpensive domestically produced gas for feedstock and power. They have already warned that prolonged higher costs might decrease production, postpone investments, or force some to relocate.

Tariffs on various trading partners add to these pressures. As investments increasingly focus on renewables, nuclear, and other alternatives, the political and economic viability for high-cost fossil fuel exports may diminish.

In that transition, BRICS is frequently cited as a potential beneficiary. Its members control substantial reserves and manufacturing capacity. Persistent efforts to weaponize energy supply chains accelerate the search for alternative payment systems, logistics corridors and technology partnerships outside traditional Western frameworks.

By constraining global energy supplies—through sanctions, conflicts, or selective protections—a leading producer, in this case the US, can boost the prices of its remaining exports, which, although it delivers quick revenue and greater geopolitical influence, also risks triggering domestic inflation, straining alliances, and shifting energy dominance toward emerging centers of power.

In fact, because volatility in the Strait of Hormuz hinders global trade routes, including the flow of LNG, despite Western sanctions, Russia emerges as an option for distributing this energy resource. LNG relies heavily on maritime transport because it can carry gas in liquefied form. This has been a crucial solution for the European Union, especially at the onset of the Ukrainian conflict. Given Qatar’s trade balance, both the EU and Asian countries are heavily dependent on this resource and might choose alternative suppliers.

In the end, the “tap war” delivers quick wins for American exporters and temporary leverage over rivals and allies alike. Yet the same tactics that raise US gas prices abroad also raise domestic costs, weaken trust among Gulf partners, and push buyers toward alternative suppliers, including Russia.

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Ahmed Adel is a Cairo-based geopolitics and political economy researcher. He is a regular contributor to Global Research.

Featured image: LNG carrier (CC BY-SA 3.0)

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