Republican Montana Senator Tim Sheehy, a 2008 U.S. Naval Academy graduate and former SEAL commando, wrote an article aimed at addressing the weakened state of the U.S. Navy in a conjuncture where the United States attacked Iran with only 25 percent public support, in the destructive shadow of the Epstein files and under the influence of Israeli geopolitics.

Published in the February 2026 issue of the U.S. Naval Institute’s journal USNI Proceedings, his article titled “A New Framework for Navy Building for the 21st Century” proposes the privatization of the Navy. The main problem, according to Sheehy, is that the Navy is in an extremely disadvantageous quantitative position compared to its closest rival, China. Although the article may initially appear to be a discussion about increasing shipyard capacity, it in fact acknowledges the structural rupture in American naval power. Today, the United States does not possess sufficient shipbuilding, maintenance, and repair capacity for a possible protracted war with China. China’s overwhelming superiority in the shipbuilding sector creates serious fragility in the strategic balance to the detriment of the United States.

At the beginning of the article, Sheehy gives the example that in 1943, during the Second World War, the United States built more ships in a single week than it can produce in an entire year today. During that period, 1,500 ships were produced in six years at the Henry Kaiser shipyards. In the Pacific War, the United States achieved victory not only through the strategic and tactical genius of its admirals but also through industrial superiority—specifically, its ability to replace ships sunk at sea. Japan could not replace its losses. The decisive factor that determined the fate of the war was production speed.

In his article, Senator Sheehy emphasizes this production capacity as the core element of naval power, arguing that quality alone is not decisive and that quantity must return. In short, deterrence cannot be sustained without mass production. However, the spirit of 1943 does not resemble the financialized American system of 2026. To bear the burden of a protracted war, the United States must reestablish a strong industrial base.

From Pax Americana to Strategic Laziness

In 1989, the U.S. Navy possessed 580 combat and auxiliary warships. With the end of the Cold War, American strategic elites embraced the assumption that the Soviet Union had completely collapsed, that there would be no competitors at sea, that the dollar system would remain permanent, and that global trade would continue under American security guarantees. This assumption produced two major misconceptions. First, that downsizing naval power would not pose a security risk. Second, that globalization would integrate China into the American-led order.

Both assumptions have been proven wrong over the past 35 years. The Global War on Terror (GWOT), initiated after September 11 and aligned with Israeli geopolitical priorities, shifted the focus of the American defense budget toward ground operations. Expenditures exceeding six trillion dollars were not allocated to shipyard infrastructure or ammunition production lines. During the same period, China quietly increased the number of its shipyards, expanded its state-controlled shipbuilding ecosystem, massively enlarged its merchant fleet, and constructed an A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) architecture. In short, while the United States was fighting terrorism, China was preparing for war at sea. Today, China can produce in one year what the United States produces in seven.

Industrial Decay

The fact that the U.S. Navy today has approximately 292 ships is problematic for a power that claims to be the guardian of all oceans. Equally important is the weakened maintenance and sustainability capacity of this fleet. With the removal of shipyard subsidies in the 1980s, the U.S. share of global ship production declined dramatically. After the Cold War, the Navy significantly reduced its in-house ship design and engineering capacity, and critical systems were brought into production without adequate testing. This resulted in cost overruns and technical problems in programs such as the Littoral Combat Ship, the Zumwalt-class destroyers, and the Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carriers.

Most warships today rely on a single manufacturer. Due to this specialized structure, production rates cannot easily be accelerated or reduced. Without a steady flow of contracts, shipyards cannot maintain a qualified workforce. Alternative commercial customers are limited. After the Cold War, hundreds of maintenance and repair facilities were closed, and shipyard infrastructure aged.

China now controls approximately 46 percent of the global shipbuilding market, while South Korea and Japan also hold significant shares. The U.S. share is well below one percent. China’s 20 large shipyards and 140 dry docks support both military and commercial production, enabling rapid wartime capacity expansion. In contrast, U.S. production infrastructure is both limited and inflexible. There are only four public shipyards and 17 dry docks in the United States, and infrastructure conditions remain poor.

The greatest weakness lies in production and maintenance capacity. There is a serious backlog. The Navy is roughly 20 years behind in maintenance; some ships are decommissioned early because modernization cannot be completed. Between 2015 and 2019, maintenance delays resulted annually in the equivalent operational loss of half an aircraft carrier and three submarines. Guam, the most important U.S. base in the Pacific, has lacked adequate dock capacity for years. Rapid maintenance capability in the Western Pacific is severely constrained. A destroyer heavily damaged by torpedoes in World War II could be repaired in nine months. Today, repairing a destroyer damaged in a collision can take two and a half years. As seen in the case of the USS Helena, a six-month maintenance cycle for a nuclear attack submarine can extend to five years.

Ammunition production is another major vulnerability. Production capacity for THAAD, Patriot, SM-3, SM-6, and Tomahawk systems is limited. Stocks are rapidly depleted in regional conflicts. American doctrine often requires firing two missiles at a single target. Multi-million-dollar interceptors are used against drones costing fifty thousand dollars. The problem is not only cost but also production speed. In a high-intensity Taiwan scenario with China, ammunition stocks could be depleted within weeks, creating a serious strategic deficit. You may have ships, but without missiles, those ships cannot deter.

Financialized Naval Power

Sheehy argues that the United States cannot close the ship production gap with China using its traditional model and that a more innovative, private-sector-based approach is required. According to him, the U.S. can rebalance its ground forces within one or two years and its air force within five but expanding naval capacity under the current model could take a decade or more—an unacceptable delay. The United States needs not only quality but also mass and flexibility. He makes an open call to Congress and the financial sector: “Build a navy for America—and build it fast.”

The senator proposes a 20–30-year leasing model, particularly for logistics ships, merchant vessels, light amphibious platforms, mine countermeasure ships, patrol boats, and unmanned surface vehicles. Complex platforms such as nuclear submarines, aircraft carriers, and destroyers would remain under the traditional state-controlled model. Other vessels, however, could be constructed by the private sector under fixed technical specifications and timelines and leased to the state under long-term agreements.

According to Sheehy, this approach would reduce the initial investment burden while providing finance capital with fixed returns and accelerating production. The critical issue, however, concerns ownership and control. If a leased ship sinks during war and the state compensates the investor, the risk becomes public. If compensation is not provided, the investor demands a risk premium. Thus, war decisions and return expectations enter the same equation. Finance capital operates on the logic of short-term returns, whereas naval power requires long-term strategic patience. The Chinese model, by contrast, is state-controlled industrial capitalism.

As the Myth of Invincibility Erodes

The Hollywood-constructed myth of American naval “invincibility” has shaped global perception for decades. Since 1944, the U.S. Navy has not fought a navy of comparable scale and technological sophistication. This created a comfort zone in which superiority remained untested. Today, that picture is changing. China is increasing its fleet of aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines, expanding advanced air defense destroyers, and enhancing its deterrence with hypersonic missile capabilities. Beijing’s A2/AD architecture within the First Island Chain—supported by land-based anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles, dense sensor networks, and integrated air defense systems—makes it significantly more difficult for U.S. carrier strike groups to approach China’s shores safely.

Asymmetric threats in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb demonstrate how even technologically advanced large navies struggle against low-cost drones and missile attacks. In the Arctic, the de facto opening of the Northern Sea Route has created a new geo-economic and geostrategic corridor outside direct American naval control. This route provides China with a geopolitical breathing space. Naval power today is not merely about the number of platforms; it is about access, industrial capacity, and logistical resilience.

Financialization: Solution or Temporary Patch?

Senator Sheehy’s proposal may provide short-term momentum but does not guarantee strategic independence. Sea power is public insurance. It is a security umbrella that protects national wealth, trade routes, energy lines, and sovereign rights. It is not a commercial asset to be insured. The Navy is not rented; it is built, owned, and, when necessary, paid for by the nation.

This debate is not unique to America. The 21st century is multipolar, and naval power has returned to its central role. Competition over energy corridors, supply chains, rare minerals, and undersea cables is intensifying. Transforming the Navy into an investment instrument for finance capital risks placing sovereignty directly under the influence of market actors and global financial circles. Leasing and privatization models risk linking war decisions and force structure planning to financial return calculations.

A privatized navy inevitably becomes a pressure instrument for lobby groups and interventionist interests. Cost transparency declines, corruption risks increase, and strategic priorities begin to align with market logic. For a superpower, this represents a long-term erosion of sovereignty. It is striking that such a proposal comes from a Republican senator aligned with MAGA at a time when the United States is deeply dependent on finance capital, particularly the influence of Netanyahu and the Israel lobby. This model aligns closely with the neoconservative vision.

*

Click the share button below to email/forward this article. Follow us on Instagram and X and subscribe to our Telegram Channel. Feel free to repost Global Research articles with proper attribution.

This article was originally published on Mavi Vatan.

Ret Admiral Cem Gürdeniz, Writer, Geopolitical Expert, Theorist and creator of the Turkish Bluehomeland (Mavi Vatan) doctrine. He served as the Chief of Strategy Department and then the head of Plans and Policy Division in Turkish Naval Forces Headquarters. As his combat duties, he has served as the commander of Amphibious Ships Group and Mine Fleet between 2007 and 2009. He retired in 2012. He established Hamit Naci Blue Homeland Foundation in 2021. He has published numerous books on geopolitics, maritime strategy, maritime history and maritime culture. He is also a honorary member of ATASAM. 

He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG).

Featured image is from the author

Global Research is a reader-funded media. We do not accept any funding from corporations or governments. Help us stay afloat. Click the image below to make a one-time or recurring donation.