Source : thechinaacademy.org – July 2, 2026 – Xan Xuetong

https://thechinaacademy.org/yan-xuetong-behind-the-us-iran-ceasefire-the-logic-of-middle-east-security-is-being-rewritten-and-china-faces-strategic-opportunities/

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After the United States and Iran reached an agreement on 60-day negotiations, the Strait of Hormuz reopened and oil prices fell. Yet the situation in the Middle East has not truly calmed down. Does this agreement represent a genuine ceasefire arrangement, or could it be disrupted at any moment and reignite conflict? At a media briefing for the World Peace Forum on June 25, Professor Yan Xuetong, Honorary Dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University, delivered a lecture entitled “Global Security Landscape and the Direction of International Order.” He analyzed recent US-Iran developments, changes in the Middle East security landscape, the trajectory of global security order, and the external environment facing China.

1.  This Is Not a Traditional Ceasefire Agreement, but an “Agreement to Negotiate”

Professor Yan first noted that, with regard to the agreement itself, it is important to clarify that the current deal is not a traditional ceasefire agreement but rather a negotiation agreement. Its core substance is that Iran has agreed to hold negotiations with the United States over the next 60 days. Previously, Iran had refused to negotiate; now that it has agreed, a temporary halt to military operations by all relevant parties is a prerequisite for ensuring that negotiations can proceed. Without a ceasefire, negotiations cannot move forward.

Thus, it is inaccurate to simply interpret this agreement as a ceasefire; its essence is to create the conditions for negotiations. The first article of the agreement requires a permanent cessation of military operations on all fronts, including Lebanon. In other words, not only must military strikes against Iranian territory stop, but military actions against targets in Yemen, Gaza, and Hezbollah in Lebanon must also cease.

This raises a critical question: Who is actually constrained from fighting—the United States or Israel? In fact, the agreement’s important target is Israel, emphasizing that Israel must not strike the Houthis, Gaza, or military forces in southern Lebanon. However, on the Israeli side, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Defense Minister Israel Katz, and Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir have just issued a joint statement declaring that they will continue military operations in southern Lebanon. Therefore, whether the 60-day negotiations can proceed smoothly depends to a large extent on whether Israel promotes or undermines the negotiations. In this sense, I believe the current agreement’s viability for 60 days does not depend on the United States and Iran but on Israel. If Israel is determined to obstruct the negotiations, it can easily make them unsustainable through continued military action.

Who can stop Israel? Realistically, only the United States has that capability. Thus, whether Washington is willing to resolve to stop Israel from continuing the war becomes a decisive factor in implementing the agreement.

At present, we see that President Trump is highly dissatisfied with Israel’s actions, and Vice President Vance has also condemned members of Netanyahu’s cabinet, publicly criticizing actions that may undermine the negotiation process. But so far, the United States has not taken substantive measures to halt Israel’s military operations. It is well known that Israel’s war-fighting capability depends heavily on US military aid and weapons supplies. Yet the United States has not announced a suspension of military support for Israel. In other words, while calling for an end to the war, Washington continues to supply weapons to Israel.

Therefore, how willing the United States actually is to promote a comprehensive ceasefire remains questionable. If the United States immediately stopped all aid to Israel and not a single bullet were allowed to reach Israel, it would be very difficult for Israel to wage a war. As long as US weapons continue to flow into Israel, Israel will retain the capability to continue fighting, and the agreement reached may not be implemented.

Beyond the ceasefire, there is also intense external interest in the claim that “the United States will push for a roughly $300 billion post-war reconstruction plan for Iran.” However, a major problem is who will bear this $300 billion. The United States hopes that the Gulf states will cover most of the cost, but they may not be willing to pay for the reconstruction of a war they did not start. Therefore, whether the United States can persuade relevant countries to participate in Iran’s reconstruction remains highly uncertain.

Professor Yan stated that there are currently two practical issues: first, whether negotiations can last for 60 days; second, whether negotiations can achieve results after 60 days. From the current situation, neither issue has received basic guarantees.

Of course, the agreement has also brought some positive effects. For example, the Strait of Hormuz has reopened and international oil prices have fallen, both positive for the world economy. But these positives do not mean that the situation can achieve long-term stability. Shortly after the agreement was signed on the 17th, Israel carried out military strikes in southern Lebanon on the 19th. Therefore, more important than the final outcome of negotiations is whether the negotiations themselves can continue. The biggest obstacle to that is not any other country, but Israel.

2.  The US Security Aura Fades, and Middle Eastern Countries Reshape Their Security Outlook

Regarding the impact of this war on the regional landscape in the Middle East, Professor Yan highlighted several new developments worth noting.

First, forces closely linked to Iran have shown greater unity. Whether the Houthis, Hezbollah, or forces in Gaza, despite suffering heavy losses in the war, their political cohesion has instead increased. In other words, the side that has been struck has not fractured but has become more united.

In contrast, internal contradictions within the side that initiated the war are increasing. The differences between the United States and Israel are becoming more evident. Vice President Vance publicly condemned Netanyahu’s government, and President Trump himself expressed great dissatisfaction. At the same time, some regional countries that had firmly supported the United States are also beginning to reassess their strategic choices.

For example, the United Arab Emirates, believing that the United States is unreliable, has openly formed a military alliance with Israel. After the two countries’ military cooperation became public, this will affect their relations with other Arab states. Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan, while still supporting the United States, are also beginning to doubt the reliability of US security commitments.

Currently, Middle Eastern countries’ doubts about the United States are mainly reflected in two aspects: first, suspicion about Washington’s determination to protect its military allies—clearly, President Trump now asks allies to pay, but may not actually be able to protect them; second, even if the Trump administration is determined to protect allies, whether the United States still has the actual capability to maintain the security of its Middle Eastern allies.

In the past, few questioned the US military’s capability to protect allies. But now the situation has changed. If the United States cannot even fully protect its own military bases in the Gulf region, then its capability to protect allies will naturally be questioned.

This change is driving adjustments in regional power structures. More and more countries believe that relying solely on the United States is no longer enough to guarantee their own security and that they need to enhance their autonomous security capabilities.

Against this backdrop, a third force has emerged: Sunni major powers represented by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, and Pakistan have begun to strengthen military cooperation. Saudi Arabia has invited Pakistan and Egypt to station troops in the country, forming a new regional military cooperation network that provides security for the Middle East through cooperation among regional countries, rather than relying entirely on the United States.

At the same time, there is a fourth noteworthy force: Oman, Qatar, Syria, Palestine, and Lebanon—five countries that have become increasingly neutral during this war. Among Gulf states, Oman has a very weak military but has not suffered from war. There was once a diplomatic concept that weak countries have no diplomacy; Oman is certainly a weak country, but does it have diplomacy? In fact, Oman’s diplomacy has been very successful. During this war, no Gulf state had more successful diplomacy than Oman. What did Oman rely on? Oman was very clever in not allowing the United States to use its military bases to launch airstrikes against Iran, so Oman suffered no military damage during the war.

Oman’s experience is worth pondering: Can a country only rely on military force to protect its security and avoid war, or should it rely more on its own diplomatic capabilities? Many small and medium-sized countries have remained at peace and avoided being drawn into war risks not because they have strong military power, but because they have smart diplomatic strategies.

This time, Oman’s approach has prompted many Middle Eastern countries to consider this question. For example, Qatar, which was among the first to suffer war strikes—the United States shut down its radar systems to facilitate Israeli bombing of Qatar—this time during the negotiations in Switzerland, while Qatar took a neutral stance, its body language such as handshakes and hugs indicated a basic leaning toward Iran rather than being pro-US, even though Qatar is a US ally. Syria, Palestine, Lebanon, and others increasingly feel that to safeguard their security, they need to learn from Oman.

The impact of this war on the Middle East is enormous and comprehensive. It is not just about oil exports and prices; it has also affected strategic relationship changes, forming military cooperation among Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Palestine, and influencing the balance of power and great-power relations. Moreover, Professor Yan emphasized that at a deeper level, it has affected Middle Eastern countries’ security outlook: what is the most effective way to safeguard national security? This is a very profound question.

3.  A Local War Triggers Three Global Security Crises

At the global level, the impact of this war is equally far-reaching.

Professor Yan believes that its comprehensive impact even exceeds that of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The Russia-Ukraine conflict also had global effects, disrupting industrial chains and severely impacting key commodities such as oil, natural gas, grain, and fertilizers at the time, but it was largely confined to Europe. The impact of this Middle East conflict is incomparable, affecting not only Europe but also East Asia, South Asia, and major global economies.

Economies such as Europe, Japan, South Korea, India, and China are highly dependent on Middle Eastern energy. Therefore, this war has a broader impact on global economic growth, international competition patterns, and countries’ security concepts.

In short, this war will bring at least three important consequences.

First, it will inevitably intensify the global arms race. With the rapid development of unmanned combat technology, the cost for the side with military superiority to launch preventive strikes continues to decline. The higher the degree of unmanned military equipment, the fewer casualties for the militarily superior side, making it more inclined to take preventive strikes—as seen in this conflict with the United States. As a result, all countries will fear being preemptively struck and will increase defense spending.

Second, Iran’s nuclear issue. The debate over Iran’s nuclear issue has already shown that many countries will believe that if Iran had nuclear weapons, the United States might not have dared to launch military strikes. Precisely because it was confirmed that Iran had no nuclear weapons, military strikes were possible. At the same time, Israel’s willingness to take tough military action is also closely related to its nuclear deterrent capability. Israel believes that as a nuclear state, striking a non-nuclear state is safe, and if it ultimately cannot achieve its goals, it could resort to nuclear retaliation. If the international community continues to apply double standards on nuclear issues, allowing some countries to possess nuclear weapons while strictly restricting others, the nuclear non-proliferation regime will face greater pressure.

Third, the security of international sea lanes will become more prominent. During this conflict, the Strait of Hormuz has repeatedly faced the risk of blockade. Since the end of World War II, while the international community has seen port blockades, it has rarely used international sea lanes themselves as instruments of war. Now, both Iran and the United States have used the Strait of Hormuz as a means of strategic pressure. This means a new issue is emerging: if blocking international sea lanes gradually becomes a means of warfare, the whole world must consider how to guarantee freedom of navigation. Most importantly, neither Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz nor the US’s blockade has been subject to any sanctions—not only no measures, but also no calls for action—which poses a new challenge to global shipping freedom in the future.

Overall, even if the 60-day negotiations proceed smoothly, the global security situation may still continue to deteriorate. Looking at the five-year trend, I believe the likelihood of improvement in the world security environment is small, while the likelihood of deterioration is greater.

This war has also made more and more people realize the importance of peace. Peace is like air—when it exists for a long time, people tend to overlook its value; but when peace becomes scarce, it becomes more important than development, just as air is more important than food.

With that, Professor Yan shared a personal observation: with such a huge disparity in military power between the United States and Iran, why cannot the United States achieve its war objectives through war? American journalists are also asking: the US government claims to have destroyed Iran’s military forces, so why can’t the war end? This war also offers an important lesson: war, although a means to achieve political goals, does not necessarily guarantee that those goals will be achieved.

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has launched many wars, but not all have achieved their intended political objectives. The Afghanistan War lasted twenty years and ended with the Taliban returning to power; the Iraq War also failed to establish a political order fully in line with US interests.

Therefore, possessing military superiority does not mean that political goals can necessarily be achieved through war. Conversely, non-military means such as diplomacy can in many cases equally safeguard national security and achieve political interests.

4.  Beyond Economic Pressure, China’s Strategic Credibility Continues to Rise

Finally, the impact of this war on China.

First, economically it has caused significant losses. In absolute terms, China’s losses may be greater than those of some countries, but in relative terms, because China’s economy is large, the proportion of damage relative to the country’s capacity to bear it is lower. Some countries may have smaller absolute losses but a higher proportion.

Politically, I believe this war has made more countries see that China is more reliable than the United States. This war has reduced the US’s strategic appeal, while China’s strategic appeal has increased. China is a country unwilling to resolve disputes with other countries through war, though it does have contradictions—with Japan, the Philippines, and others. Although these conflicts have persisted for many years, China has not used war to resolve them. The United States is not like that; when it has conflicts with other countries, it may directly use military force soon after they arise. This is why recent international polls show that favorability toward China is rising and has already exceeded favorability toward the United States.

In terms of security impact, after the US-Israel-Iran conflict broke out, many countries that had pursued strategic hedging between China and the United States began to adjust their policies. In 2010, Singapore proposed the hedging strategy of “economy relies on China, security relies on the US,” which was later emulated by many countries. By the time of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022, the concept of economic security emerged alongside economic development, and many countries began to propose “economic security relies on the US.” As a result, many countries tilted toward the United States in both military and economic security strategies, raising the US’s status and shifting the strategic balance against China.

But now the situation is beginning to reverse. Many countries say that the US government’s willingness to provide security guarantees for others is questionable, and more importantly, this war has shown that the US’s capability to provide security guarantees for others is also questionable—can the United States really protect other countries? So now many countries are beginning to seek security cooperation with China. While they still maintain strategic hedging, the content of hedging is changing. It is not just “economy relies on China, security relies on the US,” but also seeking cooperation with China on security issues. This is also why some countries are procuring weapons from both the United States and China.

References:

https://news.ifeng.com/c/8uH0U0fVXEX?ch=ttsearch