The Russia-Ukraine War, which has left four years behind, and the Iran-USA-Israel conflict, which has lasted more than 40 days and whose effects are still ongoing, have shown the whole world that the combat operational environment has undergone a radical and revolutionary transformation.

Air, land, surface, underwater and even underground operation areas began to be reshaped in terms of both symmetrical and asymmetrical forms of struggle.

Radical changes are taking place in almost every aspect of war, from weapon systems to sensors, from command-and-control structures to target detection and destruction processes.

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However, unmanned systems are undoubtedly at the center of this transformation. The low cost, high availability, widespread use and swarm operation capabilities provided by unmanned air, land, sea and underwater vehicles have opened many doctrines that have been valid on the battlefield for more than a century to discussion. Today, the most important factor determining the future of war is the new operational understanding created by unmanned systems rather than manned platforms.

Change in the Air

We can say that many armed forces in the world are rapidly switching to the procurement and production of Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (AUAV) and Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAV). Many air forces and defense companies now see fifth-generation fighter jets as the last major stage in the era of manned fighter jets. Therefore, the common feature of the sixth-generation projects is not only to produce a more advanced manned aircraft, but also to turn the manned platform into a system that works with many unmanned aerial vehicles. The aim is to transform the manned fighter jet from a stand-alone combat platform into a mission commander who manages the unmanned fighter jets (loyal wingman) around it. In this structure, a significant part of the air defense suppression, electronic warfare, reconnaissance and high-risk attack missions will be carried out by unmanned systems, while the piloted aircraft will lag and take over the management of the network-centric operation.

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UCAVs at 2025 China Victory Day Parade

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In this context, the concept of loyal wingman is developing rapidly. From the 2030s, mixed squadrons with dozens of unmanned warplanes are expected to become widespread alongside manned warplanes. Against this backdrop, the manned aircraft will not disappear completely, but it will largely be unmanned systems that take the first hit and engage in the most dangerous missions, while they are drawn into the role of decision-maker and mission manager. For this reason, the decisive force of air warfare after 2040 will not be individual fighter jets, but integrated swarm systems consisting of manned and unmanned platforms.

Türkiye’s most important platforms for this concept are Bayraktar KIZILELMA and ANKA III. Both systems are being developed to operate with TAI Kaan in the future. For this reason, Türkiye is already creating an important infrastructure in the manned-unmanned joint operation concept, which is considered one of the basic elements of the sixth-generation air warfare.

Change at Sea

The role of unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) operating on the surface in naval operations is increasing day by day. Thanks to unmanned surface vehicles that are low in cost and far from the political consequences of human loss in a network-centric warfare approach, advantages are obtained in the dimension of force multiplier in reconnaissance, surveillance, target detection, electronic warfare and attack missions. It is especially noteworthy that surface USV swarms provide wide area control at low cost, reduce the risk of human loss and increase the operational flexibility of naval forces. The use of Ukrainian USVs not only against Russian ships, but also against unarmed merchant ships and even in the maritime jurisdiction areas of third countries without carrying names, flags and identifying signs shows that these vehicles will be used very frequently in the coming period, especially in littoral areas such as the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean.

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British RNMB Harrier, an autonomous USV of the Atlas Elektronik ARCIMS mine warfare system (2020) (OGL v1.0)

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Precision of the Surface

On the other hand, considering today’s rapidly developing satellite networks, multi-layered sensor systems, artificial intelligence-supported target detection capabilities and long-range precision strike technologies, the secrecy of platforms operating on water is gradually disappearing. Soon, in the first hours of a high-intensity naval war, not only large warships but also unmanned naval vehicles operating on the water will become the primary targets of firepower originating from air, surface and other naval elements. For this reason, the surface platforms most likely to survive in the naval wars of the future will be small elements that can take advantage of the radar shadows created by narrow bays, fjord-like geographies, islands, islets and rocks, and leave low radar, acoustic and infrared signatures. These platforms will be able to minimize the risks of detection by staying still in the areas where they are located and avoiding the use of active sensors. Fueled by passive sources of information, they will wait for the opportune moment to retain the offensive initiative against opposing forces and can create unexpected effects on the battlefield. In the naval warfare of the future, superiority on the water will not belong to the largest or most powerful platforms, but to the elements that are detected at the latest and act at the right moment.

Underwater

When the history of naval battles is examined, what does not change is that the underwater remains a mystery. Today, despite the digital revolution ranging from artificial intelligence to quantum computers, the submarine’s greatest ally is still the darkness of the sea bottom. In the Second World War, the USA fought against Japan in the Pacific theater of operations with approximately 300 submarines and sank approximately 1,300 merchant ships and more than 200 warships with this force. The sunk trade tonnage is approximately 5.3 million gross tons. American submarines destroyed more than half of the Japanese merchant fleet and most of its seaborne oil, paralyzing the Japanese Empire’s economic and military logistics system, which played as important a role in Japan’s delivery as the nuclear bombs. Germany, on the other hand, built 1,200 U-boats during the war and used approximately 800 of them in active operation. German submarines sank approximately 2,800 merchant ships and hundreds of warships belonging to the Allies, sending a total of 14 to 15 million gross tons of merchant tonnage to the bottom of the sea. This figure is the highest sinking tonnage reached by any submarine force in history. Undoubtedly, it is the darkness under the water that has achieved this success.

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U-995, a typical VIIC/41 U-boat on display at the Laboe Naval Memorial near Kiel, Germany (CC BY-SA 2.0)

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During World War II, Winston Churchill admitted that

“the only thing that really frightened me throughout the war was the danger of U-boats.”

What frightened Churchill was not the landing of the German army on the shores of England. What frightened him was that the British Isle was plunged into starvation, lack of fuel, and economic collapse. Because the fate of an island state is often determined not on land, but on sea transportation lines. The Battle of the Atlantic is one of the clearest lessons that history has shown.

Admiral Frank Kelso III, Commander of the US Navy between 1991 and 1994, expressed the difficulty of going underwater:

“We can detect a small piece of metal in the depths of space, but sometimes we cannot detect the underwater object 100 meters below us.”

This fact has not changed in the intervening thirty years. This is the invisibility of the real submarine. Today, despite all the technological revolutions ranging from artificial intelligence to big data, from quantum computers to unmanned systems, the rules of acoustics still apply underwater. The uncertainty of the acoustics gives the submarine an advantage that no weapon in history has had. The underwater will remain a mystery until another detection system is found instead of acoustic energy. For this reason, both strong states and weak states are turning their eyes back to manned and unmanned submarines.

Throughout history, submarines, thanks to their invisibility, have altered the strategic balance, influenced the fate of states, and often determined the outcome of wars. For this reason, the submarine is not only a combat platform, but also the insurance of the survival of states. The most effective means of deterrence developed by humanity today are not land-based hypersonic ballistic missiles, but ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) that silently roam the depths of the seas. This fact lies at the heart of the USA, Russia, China, England and France to still maintain their global power status. It is not for nothing that Admiral Sergey Gorshkov, the architect of Soviet naval strategy, said:

“Submarines are the main force of the navy.”

Mao Zedong also demonstrated the following historical determination while China was still struggling with poverty and famine:

“We will build nuclear submarines even if it takes ten thousand years.”

Today, that strategic will lies at the heart of China’s becoming a global power opening to the oceans.

Demand for Underwater Will Increase

As of 2026, there are 195 countries in the world, only about 120 of them have naval forces. Among these, approximately 42 states, including Türkiye, operate operational submarines. Today, global and regional powers continue to invest in submarines. The United States allocates hundreds of billions of dollars to its nuclear submarine fleet. While Russia is building new classes of Borey and Jasen, China is growing its underwater power every year. Among these states, the number of states operating autonomous unmanned submarine vehicles is around 15. In the 20th century, the elite club of naval power was the submarine-owning states. In the second quarter of the 21st century, the new elite club began to become states operating long-range autonomous underwater systems. Today, there are around 10 countries that produce autonomous underwater vehicles that can operate independently underwater and carry weapons with a range of hundreds of miles.

The situation is no different for Türkiye. When the Republican Navy was established, Commander-in-Chief Mustafa Kemal Atatürk placed the submarine at the center of the navy. Because he saw that the most effective way to defend the straits and Blue Homeland was underwater. 100 years have passed, technologies and threats have changed, but Atatürk’s strategic foresight has not changed. Today, Turkish submarines continue to develop with great momentum.

Semi-Submersibles

Today, the world still focuses largely on classical surface USVs. However, in parallel with what has happened in the last 4 years, the real game-changing systems in the future will be semi-submersible or platforms that are very close to the water surface. In other words, we can say that unmanned underwater vehicles, underwater sensor networks and semi-submersible platforms that can rise to the surface and dive again when necessary will come to the fore rather than the classical surface USVs of the future of the future on the water. These systems, which have an extremely low radar cross-sectional area and can be completely hidden by sinking, when necessary, will play a critical role in both reconnaissance-surveillance and attack missions. These platforms greatly reduce the radar cross-section area, make satellite and visual detections difficult, and make the work of guided missile search and illumination radars difficult. We can say that the ultimate evolution of the kamikaze USV concept will be high-speed semi-submersible assault vehicles. When used in swarms, these can seriously strain the close air defense systems of existing warships.

Underwater Network Architecture

Today, the most invisible and survivable element of naval warfare is submarines. While a frigate or amphibious ship can be tracked from space, UAV, radar and electro-optical systems, the submarine is still the most difficult platform to detect. For this reason, the core of the network-centric operation of the future should be considered underwater, not on water. Türkiye should undoubtedly be ready for crisis, escalation and war in the areas of geopolitical interests in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean. Once it starts, the political result of the war is to weaken the opponent’s determination and will to continue the war. As well as destroying the rival’s fleet, preventing maritime transportation and making its ports and bases unusable will make it easier to achieve political results. Apart from these goals, projecting power to land is among the most important duties of the navy within the scope of joint operations. However, this option is only successful when air and sea control/superiority is achieved.

If air and sea superiority cannot be established in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, all manned and unmanned surface forces operating in the littoral battlespace will face the constant risk of rapid destruction. In such an environment, reconnaissance, surveillance, sensor, communications and command-and-control infrastructures—the very backbone of network-centric warfare—will become priority targets. Through a combination of kinetic strikes, cyber-attacks and intensive electronic warfare, these systems are likely to be degraded or neutralized in the opening hours of a conflict.

Until redundant and backup systems can be activated, naval units at sea, whether manned or unmanned, will be deprived not only of targeting data but also of the tactical situational awareness necessary for survival. Blind, deaf and disconnected, they will become increasingly vulnerable to destruction by long-range precision fires.

Against concentrated firepower delivered simultaneously from the air, the surface and beneath the sea, platforms such as USV swarms, TB-3s, TCG Anadolu, frigates, coastal command centers and the broader network-centric operational concept reveal a common vulnerability. All ultimately depend on command-and-control nodes operating within the electromagnetic spectrum and, to a significant degree, on infrastructures located above the surface of the sea.

The lessons emerging from the Russia-Ukraine War, the confrontations in the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz, and the proliferation of increasingly accurate long-range missiles demonstrate a harsh reality which is the greatest weakness of network-centric warfare is the network itself. Once the electromagnetic architecture is disrupted, detected or destroyed, the combat effectiveness of even the most sophisticated surface platforms rapidly deteriorates. In contrast, the underwater domain remains the most survivable and least transparent battlespace. As sensors become ubiquitous and long-range strike capabilities proliferate, survivability increasingly shifts below the surface. Future naval warfare will therefore be decided not by who dominates the surface, but by who controls the underwater battlespace.

A flagship like TCG Anadolu will become the most valuable target for the enemy, although it is considered as the command center of many USVs, UAVs and other unmanned systems in the future. If this command center is disabled because of a ballistic missile, hypersonic missile, cruise missile salvo or swarm attack, there will be a risk of collapse of the entire network. In this case, even if dozens of USVs and UAVs are on the field, the joint operation capability may be greatly paralyzed. Therefore, in the naval war of the future, the main center of gravity should be to ensure the survival of the command-and-control network.

In this context, a second paradigm shift is needed. For strategic, operative and tactical situational awareness, an underwater-centered network architecture should be established in parallel with the surface-centered network architecture. SOSUS (Sound Surveillance System), which was used by the USA and NATO during the Cold War, is an important example of this. Thanks to hydrophone networks placed in the Atlantic and Pacific, Soviet submarines could be tracked from thousands of miles. Today, much more advanced versions of this can be established thanks to artificial intelligence, quantum sensors, distributed acoustic sensing and seabed communication systems. Türkiye should also develop a “Blue Homeland Underwater Network“ consisting of fixed and mobile sensors in the Black Sea, Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean. This network can provide a continuous flow of information between seafloor sensors capable of LOFAR/TRN measurement, autonomous underwater vehicles, acoustic listening systems, seabed data centers, manned and unmanned submarines, autonomous underwater vehicles, USVs and UAVs. In other words, my suggestion is to create an underwater Long Horizon System.

Conclusion

In the coming decades, it will not be sufficient for Türkiye to focus solely on traditional underwater force multipliers such as MİLDEN, a future nuclear-powered submarine capability, AKYA heavyweight torpedoes, and Gezgin and Atmaca missiles. These systems will remain indispensable, but they will constitute only one layer of a much broader underwater warfare architecture.

Future naval superiority will belong to the nations that can transform the underwater domain into an integrated battlespace of sensors, autonomous systems and persistent surveillance. For this reason, Türkiye must simultaneously invest in semi-submersible reconnaissance, surveillance and strike platforms, autonomous underwater vehicles capable of operating independently for extended periods, unmanned mini-submarines able to launch torpedoes or deploy aerial drones from beneath the surface, and distributed underwater sensor networks capable of maintaining continuous awareness even in the most contested environments.

This requirement is particularly critical in the Aegean Sea. Its dense geography of islands, islets and rocky outcrops creates an ideal environment for underwater maneuver, concealment and persistent surveillance. In such a battlespace, the establishment of a “Blue Homeland Underwater Reconnaissance and Surveillance Network” is no longer merely an option but a strategic imperative. This network would provide the Turkish Navy with uninterrupted underwater situational awareness during peacetime, crisis, escalation and war, while simultaneously denying an adversary the ability to operate undetected.

Türkiye must therefore develop a sovereign national underwater information architecture extending across the Aegean, Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea. The objective should not simply be to deploy more submarines or more weapons, but to create a comprehensive underwater ecosystem capable of sensing, processing, transmitting and exploiting information continuously under combat conditions.

The decisive factor in future naval warfare will not be the number of ships afloat or missiles in inventory. The success will belong to the side that can remain invisible beneath the surface while observing everything above it; The side that can sustain its flow of information when all other networks have been disrupted and the side that can dominate the underwater battlespace before the first shot is fired. In the age of ubiquitous sensors and long-range precision strike, control of the seas will increasingly depend on control of what lies beneath them.

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This article was originally published on Mavi Vatan.

Ret Admiral Cem Gürdeniz, Writer, Geopolitical Expert, Theorist and creator of the Turkish Bluehomeland (Mavi Vatan) doctrine. He served as the Chief of Strategy Department and then the head of Plans and Policy Division in Turkish Naval Forces Headquarters. As his combat duties, he has served as the commander of Amphibious Ships Group and Mine Fleet between 2007 and 2009. He retired in 2012. He established Hamit Naci Blue Homeland Foundation in 2021. He has published numerous books on geopolitics, maritime strategy, maritime history and maritime culture. He is also a honorary member of ATASAM. 

He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG).

Featured image is from the author

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